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Second, when are plans formed? Third, how do plans deviate from optimality? For each of these
questions, we (a) offer a brief overview of research that sheds light on the issue and (b) identify gaps in
current knowledge. We emphasize connections to the growing theoretical literature that gives personal
plans a substantive role, but we conclude that more research is needed, especially on the latter two
questions we cover.
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Beyond Beta-Delta:
The Emerging Economics of Personal Plans†
By John Beshears, Katherine L. Milkman, and Joshua Schwartzstein*

In his book Misbehaving: The Making of
Behavioral Economics, Richard Thaler writes
about “Supposedly Irrelevant Factors” (SIFs),
or factors that observably affect economic decisions but are neglected by neoclassical models of consumer behavior (Thaler 2015). In
this article, we highlight an important SIF that
is neglected not only by neoclassical models,
but also by now-standard behavioral economics models like the beta-delta model of time
discounting (Laibson 1997). That SIF is a
“personal plan.”
For example, consider someone who has the
opportunity to engage in a preventive health
action, such as obtaining a flu shot or a cancer
screening. If she has beta-delta preferences, she
may fail to take the action because it entails
up-front costs (inconvenience and discomfort)
and delayed benefits (improved future health),
even though she may deem the action to be in her
overall best interest when she judges it before
the opportunity for action arises. According to
the beta-delta model, techniques for increasing
the likelihood that this individual will take the
preventive health measure include reducing the
up-front costs or offering her a commitment
device. Recent field studies, however, have
documented the success of another technique.
Simply prompting people to form concrete
plans of action regarding when, where, and how
they will implement their intentions produces

improvements in follow-through, even when
such prompts do not alter the costs and benefits of the action or change the opportunities for
using commitment strategies (Milkman et al.
2011, 2013).
People make personal plans frequently (e.g.,
they write “to do” lists, keep calendars, and set
deadlines). Many popular books, like Getting
Things Done: The Art of Stress-Free Productivity,
are devoted to the topic (Allen 2002). However,
personal plans for future actions play a limited
role in traditional economic analyses of individual decision making. Neoclassical models
typically treat a personal plan as nothing more
than an agent’s (correct) understanding of the
actions she will take in every possible future
contingency.
Plans become more interesting when agents’
actions deviate in predictable ways from those
plans (see Milkman, Rogers, and Bazerman
2008 for one review), for example as a consequence of beta-delta intertemporal discount
functions (Laibson 1997) or the conflicting preferences of “multiple selves” (Thaler and Shefrin
1981). If an analyst were looking for the object
in these models that most closely resembles a
personal plan, she might point to the agent’s
most preferred complete contingent future
course of action. Alternatively, she might point
to the agent’s beliefs about the course of action
the agent will take, regardless of the accuracy
of those beliefs (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999).
In this article, we adopt a third perspective
that emphasizes how personal plans can play a
more direct role in influencing behavior, and not
only to overcome self-control problems: the simple act of planning to take an action can increase
the likelihood of taking that action. An individual may not form a concrete plan in the first
place. If the individual does form a plan, it may
correspond neither to preferred future actions
nor to beliefs about future actions because, for
example, such a plan allows her to implement a
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personal management strategy that counteracts
limited attention. An individual may also form
a plan for less sophisticated reasons, and such a
plan may become self-fulfilling. For example, a
person who arbitrarily plans to order chicken at a
restaurant (perhaps because she recently saw an
advertisement for chicken) may be more likely
to end up choosing chicken over fish because the
plan creates a reference point from which she
is reluctant to deviate (Kahneman and Tversky
1979; Kőszegi and Rabin 2006).
We are not the first to take up personal plans
as the subject of economic inquiry, but we wish
to highlight the important yet underappreciated
role of plans in driving economic outcomes. We
organize our discussion by considering three
questions. First, what are the effects of plans
on behavior? Second, when are plans formed?
Third, how do plans deviate from optimality?
For each of these questions, we (i) offer a brief
overview of existing research that sheds light on
the issue and (ii) identify gaps in current knowledge. We emphasize connections to the growing
theoretical literature that gives personal plans
a substantive role, but we conclude that more
research is needed, especially on the latter two
questions we cover.
I. What Do Plans Do?

We discuss three ways in which plans affect
behavior.
First, planning helps us overcome barriers to
following through on our intentions. The planning prompts mentioned above have been shown
to improve follow-through in domains ranging
from voting (Nickerson and Rogers 2010) to
obtaining flu shots (Milkman et al. 2011). One
barrier to follow-through that planning prompts
help people overcome is the failure to attend to
logistics (e.g., arranging childcare in order to
visit the doctor). Contemplating logistical hurdles in advance makes it easier to develop strategies for working around them. Another barrier to
follow-through that planning prompts help people address is forgetfulness. Encouraging people to articulate a plan embeds intentions more
firmly in memory by prompting deeper processing and attention. Planning prompts also associate cues like the intended execution time with
the need to act. In line with this reasoning, planning prompts are particularly effective among
populations at higher risk for 

forgetfulness,
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such as the elderly and parents (Milkman et al.
2013).1
Second, plans create goals or personal rules
with the purpose of helping people follow
through on their intentions. A large literature
demonstrates that setting a challenging, yet
attainable, explicit goal increases achievement, even in the absence of external incentives
(Locke and Latham 1990). One force at play is
people’s strong desire to be internally consistent
and thus to avoid breaking explicit commitments (Festinger 1962). In addition, people may
be reluctant to fall short of goals, which could
become reference points, because of loss aversion (Heath, Larrick, and Wu 1999).2,3
Third, plans influence behavior because they
frame decisions even when they are not formed
with the objective of increasing follow-through.
To take an example, models of expectations-based reference dependence predict a
stronger taste for buying insurance when the
opportunity to buy is anticipated—and a plan to
buy is made—than when it is not, since expected
premium payments are then not coded as a loss
(Kőszegi and Rabin 2006, 2007).4
II. When Do People Form Plans?

The research described in the previous section highlights the effects of plans on behavior,

1
Models of “thinking ahead” in economics include
Bolton and Faure-Grimaud (2009).
2
Models of personal rules in economics include Bénabou
and Tirole (2004) and Hsiaw (2013).
3
One particularly interesting class of personal rules
has been dubbed “mental accounting.” Mental accounting
describes the tendency to treat time and money as if they
are not fungible but instead belong to distinct accounts that
can only be used for a predetermined purpose or during a
predetermined time interval (Thaler 1985). By creating
mental budget limits (e.g., “I will only spend $3,000 on leisure travel this year”), people may be able to overcome the
impulse to splurge on temptations.
4
Plans also matter in models where the choice context
influences how attributes of different options are weighed
(Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2013; Kőszegi and Szeidl
2013; Bushong, Rabin, and Schwartzstein 2015) because
this context can be shaped by the timing of when an agent
forms her plan. For example, in the Bushong et al. model
of relative thinking, a worker is less willing to put in effort
for a fixed return in an environment where she expected to
earn more at the time of making her plan, since this makes
the return feel small. The model suggests that she would be
more inclined to put in effort if, prior to making a plan, she
received a more precise signal about returns.
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but it largely leaves open the question of when
people form plans. People do not update their
plans continuously. One model is that individuals update their plans at regular intervals on
a fixed schedule (Gabaix and Laibson 2002).
Another is that individuals incur cognitive costs
from planning and choose when to plan by trading off those cognitive costs against the benefits
of optimizing their decisions (Reis 2006). Both
models likely contain some truth, but research in
psychology indicates that planning takes place
on a more nuanced schedule.
Research on the “fresh start effect” has
shown that people are more likely to engage in
self-controlled acts, such as planning, at the start
of new cycles like the beginning of the week,
month, or year and following holidays and birthdays. People search more for the term “diet” on
Google and create personal goals at a higher rate
following these fresh start dates (Dai, Milkman,
and Riis 2014). At the start of a new cycle, people perceive that their previous failings occurred
in the more distant past, and this greater psychological distance creates an opportunity to break
with bad patterns of behavior and form new,
optimistic plans (Dai, Milkman, and Riis 2015).
Past research in psychology has also shown
that life shocks (e.g., job changes) that alter a
person’s surroundings and routines often induce
changes to plans (Wood, Tam, and Witt 2005).
In many cases, the timing of the plan change is
rational, but there is also evidence that people
update their plans when predictable shocks to
their circumstances occur, such as when a job
seeker exhausts unemployment insurance benefits (Ganong and Noel 2015).

future behavior. For example, forgetting to take
your medication is partly attributable to forgetfulness, but also partly due to a failure to make
plans that compensate for forgetfulness. We can
set alarms to take our pills, but many of us do
not, contributing to low adherence (Osterberg
and Blaschke 2005; Baicker, Mullainathan, and
Schwartzstein 2015). Along these lines, many
people are unwilling to pay to have a cue that
serves as an effective reminder for engaging in a
beneficial behavior, even when the cue leads to
higher economic payoffs net of its cost (Rogers
and Milkman 2015). Also, the fact that planning
prompts can be effective (as discussed above)
suggests that people do not always form effective plans (Milkman et al. 2011).
IV. Conclusion

People often develop personal plans to help
themselves follow through on their intentions.
Plans can also influence behavior by shaping
reference points and how decisions are framed.
However, a complete account of the role of plans
in economic decision making will require deeper
knowledge of when and how plans are formed.
There are also important open questions
regarding how best to measure plans, as eliciting
a plan may alter it or cause it to be created in
the first place. Despite this challenge, our understanding of the role of plans in driving economic
outcomes would be greatly enriched by considering whether, when, where, and how people
intend to take actions and collecting more data
on these questions.
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Kőszegi, Botond, and Adam Szeidl. 2013. “A
Model of Focusing in Economic Choice.”

433

Quarterly Journal of Economics 128 (1):
53–104.
Laibson, David. 1997. “Golden Eggs and
Hyperbolic Discounting.” Quarterly Journal
of Economics 112 (2): 443–77.
Locke,

Edwin A.,

and

Gary

P.

Latham.

1990. A Theory of Goal Setting and Task
Performance. Englewood Cliffs: PrenticeHall.
Loewenstein, George, Ted O’Donoghue, and Matthew Rabin. 2003. “Projection Bias in Pre-

dicting Future Utility.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 118 (4): 1209–48.

Milkman, Katherine L., John Beshears, James J.
Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte C. Madrian.

2011. “Using Implementation Intentions
Prompts to Enhance Influenza Vaccination
Rates.” Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences of the United States of America 108
(26): 10415–420.

Milkman, Katherine L., John Beshears, James J.
Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte C. Madrian.

2013. “Planning Prompts as a Means of
Increasing Preventive Screening Rates.” Preventive Medicine 56 (1): 92–93.

Milkman, Katherine L., Todd Rogers, and Max
H. Bazerman. 2008. “Harnessing Our Inner

Angels and Demons: What We Have Learned
About Want/Should Conflicts and How That
Knowledge Can Help Us Reduce ShortSighted Decision Making.” Perspectives on
Psychological Science 3 (4): 324–38.
Nickerson, David W., and Todd Rogers. 2010.
“Do You Have a Voting Plan? ImplementationIntentions, Voter Turnout, and Organic Plan
Making.” Psychological Science 21 (2): 194–
99.
O’Donoghue, Ted, and Matthew Rabin. 1999.
“Doing It Now or Later.” American Economic
Review 89 (1): 103–24.
Osterberg, Lars, and Terrence Blaschke. 2005.
“Adherence to Medication.” New England
Journal of Medicine 353 (5): 487–97.
Reis, Ricardo. 2006. “Inattentive Consumers.”
Journal of Monetary Economics 53 (8): 1761–
1800.
Rogers, Todd, and Katherine L. Milkman.

2015. “Reminders through Association.”
Unpublished.
Thaler, Richard. 1985. “Mental Accounting and
Consumer Choice.” Marketing Science 4 (3):
199–214.

434

AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS

Thaler, Richard H. 2015. Misbehaving: The Mak-

ing of Behavioral Economics. New York: W.
W. Norton & Company.
Thaler, Richard H., and H. M. Shefrin. 1981. “An
Economic Theory of Self-Control.” Journal of

MAY 2016

Political Economy 89 (2): 392–406.

Wood, Wendy, Leona Tam, and Melissa Guerrero
Witt. 2005. “Changing Circumstances, Dis-

rupting Habits.” Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology 88 (6): 918–33.

